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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
-vs- ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 930372-CA 
) Case Type: APPEAL 
1 Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Defendant/Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, and hereby respectfully submits this Petition for 
Rehearing. 
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light 
of the following points and issues: 
Point 1. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the 
Circuit Court's jurisdiction in this case was derivative and 
the Defendant could not be prosecuted and convicted for a 
different offense in the Circuit Court than as the Defendant 
was charged by Information in the Logan City Municipal Justice 
Court. 
Point 2. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the 
Defendant has been effectively deprived of any and all rights 
to appeal his conviction as guaranteed under Article I, § 12 
and Article VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
Point 3. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that 
the Defendants challenge to the trial court's violation of 
the separation of power provisions constituted a challenge 
to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction which could be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
DISCUSSION OF POINT 1. 
Point 1. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the 
Circuit Court's jurisdiction in this case iras derivative and 
the Defendant could not be prosecuted and convicted for a 
different offense in the Circuit Court than as the Defendant 
was charged by Information in the Logan City Municipal 
Justice Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Mansfield/ 576 P.2d 
1276, 1277 (Utah 1978) observed: 
While the matter is not raised by either party on this 
appeal, there are two reasons why the dismissal must 
stand. In the first place, a complaint on appeal from 
a city court cannot be amended in the district court. 
The district court has only derivative jurisdiction and, 
therefore, if the complaint was faulty in the city court, 
it remains faulty on appeal. 
Though, the Information was not formally amended by the 
Circuit Court on appeal in this case. The offense of which 
the Defendant was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court 
was different than as charged by Information in the Logan City 
Municipal Justice Court. 
The Defendant was charged by Information in the Logan City 
Municipal Justice Court with the offense of Following another 
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Vehicle Too Closely on November 7, 1992 in violation of Utah 
Code Ann, § 41-6-62 as follows: 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public 
offense(s) were: That the said Defendant, being the 
driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there on the 
streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more 
closely than was reasonable and prudent have due regard 
for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon the 
conditions of the street. 
Instruction No. 12 given by the Circuit Court to the jury 
in this case states: 
Before you may convict the Defendant of following too 
close, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements of that crime, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the 
time and place as alleged in the Information. 
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache 
County, State of Utah. 
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant between 
vehicles was not reasonable and prudent. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty of this 
offense. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to 
so establish one or more of the said elements, then you 
should find the defendant not guilty of this offense. 
The offense was amended and altered in the instant case 
when the trial court eliminated the requirement of the State 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant followed 
another vehicle more closely that was reasonable and prudent 
"having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic 
upon and the conditions of the street." 
Mansfield, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court under the 
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former provisions of Article VIII, § 9 of the Utah Constitution 
which provided: 
Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases 
to District Courts on both questions of law and fact, 
with such limitations and restrictions as shall be 
provided by law; and the decision of the District 
Court on such appeals shall be final, except in cases 
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute. 
Thus, under the current provisions of Rule 26(13)(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review all 
jurisdictional issues pertaining to appeals from the Logan City 
Municipal Justice Court to the First Circuit Court that arise 
in the instant case. 
DISCUSSION OF POINT 2. 
Point 2. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the 
Defendant has been effectively deprived of any and all rights 
to appeal his conviction as guaranteed under Article I, § 12 
and Article VII/ § 5 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
First, the Defendant contends that he was effectively deprived 
of any and all rights to appeal his conviction for the offense of 
Following another Vehicle Too Closely by the Circuit Court improperly 
instructing the jury as to all the elements that constitute the 
offense of Following Too Close as defined under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-62, (1953 as amended). 
Secondly, the Defendant contends that he was effectively deprived 
of any and all rights to appeal his conviction and was subjected 
to arbitrary and invidious discrimination by the Circuit Courtfs 
failure to instruct the jury "if they believed any witness had 
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willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this 
case, they were at liberty to disregard the whole of the 
testimony of such witness, except as he may have been corroborated 
by credible witnesses or credible evidence. 
This is a standard instruction which has been given in all 
criminal cases except the instant case since the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled on the matter in State v. Morris, 40 Utah 431, 122 P. 
380 (1912) • This instruction does not depend upon any certain 
quantum of evidence to be introduced at trial, but does appear to 
be mandatory. 
The Defendant was deprived of his right to appeal and was 
subjected to arbitrary and invidious discrimination because the 
Circuit Court's failure to give this instruction which would have 
given the jury the discretion to totally reject all of Russell J. 
Roper's testimony and found the Defendant not guilty if they 
believed he willfully testified falsely as to any material fact 
in this case. 
Officer Roperfs testimony was not corroborated by any other 
witnesses or evidence. There was no evidence at trial of any 
accident which would have corroborated his testimony. 
Thirdly, the Defendant has been deprived of his right to 
appeal by the Circuit Courtfs failure to rule on the Defendant's 
request to be furnished with a transcript of proceedings for the 
purpose of this appeal at public expense under the standards set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mayer v. City of 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
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The record in this case shows that the Defendant requested 
a partial transcript of the proceedings. (R. 20). The 
Defendant thereafter filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity in 
the Circuit Court stating that because of his poverty, he was 
unable to pay the costs of the partial transcript. (R. 22) The 
Circuit Court did not render any decision as to whether or not 
the Defendant would be provided with a transcript for the purpose 
of this appeal. The issue raised by the Defendant on appeal was 
that the statute under which the Defendant was convicted was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. 
The State in its Brief states that the Defendant has not provided 
the Court of Appeals with a trial transcript. (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 5). However, it has been Logan City who has failed to pay for 
and provide the Defendant with a partial transcript to adequately 
raise all issues on appeal. 
DISCUSSION OF POINT 3, 
Point 3. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the 
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's violation of the 
separation of power provisions constituted a challenge to the 
Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction which could be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Court in Arrinqton v. United States/ 585 A.2d 1342, 
1344 (D.C. App. 1991) observed: 
The government's contention that only appellant Arrington 
has, in Appeal no. 89-637, preserved this issue for appeal, 
is meritless. Appellantfs challenge to the validity of the 
Act, that the statute had become invalid and ceased to exist, 
raises a jurisdictional issue. In the absence of a valid 
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statute their prosecutions could not be maintained under 
the Act. Challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived. 
The Defendant was prosecuted and convicted for a different 
offense than charged in the Information and the offense as 
instructed to the jury by the Circuit Court was different the 
offense as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 and the 
violation by the Circuit Court of the separation of powers 
provisions constitutes a challenge by the Defendant to the 
Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be 
waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the issues raised 
by the Defendant on appeal should be reconsidered and the 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed, or as an alternative, 
this matter be restored to the calendar for resubmission. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 31st day of October, 1995. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLS^tt 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
The Defendant certifies that this petition is submitted 
in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, postage prepaid, to the 
following listed below on this 31st day of October, 1995: 
Donald G. Linton 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main ^ \ . y] 4 
Logan, Utah 84321 < 7 ' / /^ ' / ' / 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Craig Carlsen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
riLtu 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 0 5 1995 
Marilyn M. Brancn 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Official 
Publication) 
Case No. 930372-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 5, 1995) 
First Circuit, Logan Department 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Attorneys: David Craig Carlsen, Logan, Appellant Pro Se 
Donald G. Linton, Logan, for Appellee 
Before Judges Onae, Bench, and Wilkins (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his conviction for following a police 
officer's vehicle too closely in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-62 (1993). 
On appeal, defendant contends the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and violates the separation of powers 
provision of the Utah Constitution. The statute is not vague in 
all its applications. U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). 
Further, the instruction given covered the statutory elements of 
the offense. We have reviewed defendant's claims and conclude 
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We decline to 
reach defendant's claim that the statute violates the separation 
of powers provision on the basis that this issue was not raised 
in the trial court. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Gregory K Presiding Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
IN THE LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. ] 
CARLSEN, David Craig 
316 South Main #9 
Logan, Utah ] 
3/5/45 
Defendant ] 
) I N F O R M A T I O N 
No. 92-6555 
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named 
Defendant with the commission of the following public offense(s): 
COUNT 1: 
CRIME: FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE 
CLASSIFICATION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
IN VIOLATION OF: 41-6-62, Utah Code Annotated 
AT: Logan, Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: 11/7/92 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense(s) were: 
That the said Defendant, being the driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there 
on the streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more closely than was 
reasonable and prudent having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the 
traffic upon the conditions of the street. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
R. J. ROPER, LCPD 
R. J. PETERSON, LCPD 
DATED 1/2 - / * ?^~ 
DAMAGES: YES NO 
Date Filed: hO-h Q£L 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you may convict the Defendant of following too close, you must 
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the time and 
place as alleged in the Information. 
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache County, State 
of Utah. 
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant between vehicles 
was not reasonable and prudent. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to find the defendant guilty of this offense. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements, 
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAV1D CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED REQUEST 
FOR PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
Case No. 925003231 
TO: Penny C. Abbott 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig 
Carlsen, and hereby requests a partial transcript of the 
proceedings held in the above-entitled matter in this Court 
as follows: 
1. A full transcript of the proceedings held on 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence held in this Court 
on February 8, 1993. 
2. A partial transcript of the proceedings held at 
trial on March 26, 1993 which should include the following: 
(a) The full testimony of Russell J. Roper. 
(b) The full testimony of defendant, David Craig Carlsen, 
(c) Exceptions by the defendant as to jury instructions. 
(d) Defendant's verbal motion in arrest of judgment. 
C&se 
\vkO 
flfi 
- ? • ' £ -
(e) Conversation between the Court, defendant and 
the prosecutor prior to imposition of sentence. 
(f) Imposition of sentence. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1993. 
1)AVID CRAIG CARLSE "' <*£/4>—^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Amended request for partial transcript to Scott L. 
Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main, Logan, 
Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S. 
Mailbox on this 22nd day of July, 1993. 
^C^a/?M^7 /Zut*4&, / ^ 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN^/ 
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DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
LOGAN D ! S T R ! C T 
DEC IS 3 s i iJ f33 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
Case No- 925003231 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Cache ) 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
I have heretofore requested a partial transcript of proceedings 
held in the above-entitled matter for the purpose of appeal. I 
have been confined in the Cache County Jail for the past 26 days 
without work release and am unable to pay the costs of said transcript. 
Because of my poverty the costs of said transcript would make me 
destitute and I request an Order to provide the same. I verily 
FILED. ff<3A 
DEC 1 6 1993 
BY /Y\o,G> 
believe that I am entitled to the relief I seek on said appeal. 
•r^^^z-t^rr >1<~<X4^ 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEI 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this 16th day of December, 1993 
/S&*^>Q /fY*& 
My Commission Expires: wn*. 
_ . •, j# ,<T^^v NOTARY PUBLIC
 T T , T T , , 
ALLREP 
6 1 0 North Main* P.O. Box 1 7 1 
Logan, UT 84321 
My Commission Expirts: _ _ 
StataofUtah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true ancl exact copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit to the Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main, 
Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a 
U.S. Mailbox on this 16th day of December, 1993. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLS 
y /Z^ZA^OJZy\ 
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When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and chil-
dren, as may be equitable. . 
It is to be particularly noted that that lan-
guage is in general terms and contains no 
hint of limitation. The import of our deci-
sions implementing that statute is that pro-
ceedings in regard to the family are equita-
ble in a high degree; and that the court 
may take into consideration all of the perti-
nent circumstances.2 It is our opinion that 
the correct view under our law is that this 
encompasses all of the assets of every na-
ture possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived; 
and that this includes any such pension 
fund or insurance. These should be given 
due consideration along with all other as-
sets, income and the earnings and the po-
tential earning capacity of the parties, in 
determining what is the most practical, just 
and equitable way to serve the best inter-
ests and welfare of the parties and their 
children.3 
[5] Defendant's other ground of attack 
is that the decree requires him to maintain 
certain life insurance policies with his chil-
dren as beneficiaries for a period of 15 
years. On this point defendant is correct. 
He is not legally obligated to provide any 
such support or benefit for his son Robert 
who is 25 years of age; and he is obliged to 
do so for his daughter Diane only until she 
attains the age of 18 years.4 It is therefore 
necessary that the decree be modified ac-
cordingly. 
Affirmed as modified. The parties to 
bear their own costs. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
2. See Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 
265. 
3. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977. 
4. U.C.A.1953, Sec. 15-2-1, formerly provided 
that the period of minority extended in males 
to 21 years and females to 18 years, but in 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Thomas Michael MANSFIELD, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 15375. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 1978. 
Defendant appealed from his conviction 
in City Court of Brigham City of driving 70 
miles per hour. The First District Court, 
Box Elder County, VeNoy Christoffersen, 
J., permitted State's amendment to com-
plaint and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss, and State appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) complaint 
on appeal from city court could not be 
amended in district court, and (2) where 
amended complaint filed in district court 
was never signed by any complaining wit-
ness, dismissal of complaint was mandated. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>260.13 
Complaint on appeal from city court 
could not be amended in district court; 
since district court only had derivative jur-
isdiction, if complaint was faulty in city 
court, it remained faulty on appeal. 
2. Indictment and Information <^ =*162 
Where defendant was convicted in city 
court of driving 70 miles per hour in viola-
tion of resolution adopted by State Road 
Commission, where, on appeal, district court 
permitted amendment which charged that 
S.L.U.1975, Ch. 39, Sec. 1, it was changed to 
make minority extend to 18 years for both 
sexes, however it added that courts in divorce 
actions may order support to age 21. See also 
exception noted in Dehm v. Dehm in footnote 1 
above. 
STATE v. MANSFIELD 
Cite as 576 PJd 1276 
Utah 1277 
defendant dro^e 70 miles per hour in viola-
tion of proclamation issued by Governor, 
but where amended complaint filed in dis-
trict court was never signed by any com-
plaining witness, dismissal of complaint was 
mandated. U.C.A.1953, 77-57-2, 78-4-16. 
3. Indictment and Information <3=>52(1) 
Person can only be tried for misde-
meanor on complaint duly signed and sworn 
to before magistrate. U.C.A.1953, 77-57-2, 
78-4-16. 
a city court cannot be amended in the dis-
trict court. The district court has only de-
rivative jurisdiction and, therefore, if the 
complaint was faulty in the city court, it 
remains faulty on appeal.1 
[2,3] In the second place, the amended 
complaint filed in the district court was 
never signed by any complaining witness 
and a person can only be tried for a misde-
meanor on a complaint duly signed and 
sworn to before a magistrate.2 
The reason why the state desired to 
amend the complaint was because this 
Court had held in the case of State v. 
Foukas* that the resolution adopted by the 
State Road Commission was void and of no 
force and effect. 
It is not necessary to consider the point 
raised on this appeal, to wit: the constitu-
tionality of the proclamation of the Gover-
nor. That matter is dealt with in a com-
panion case decided at this term of Court, 
viz: State in the Interest of David Prisbey, 
a person under eighteen years of age.4 
Since the district court had no jurisdic-
tion to try the respondent on the amended 
complaint, it properly granted respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss and that judgment is 
hereby affirmed. No costs are awarded. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, 0. Dee Lund, Box Elder County Atty., 
Jon J. Bunderson, Deputy Box Elder Coun-
ty Atty., Brigham City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Grant M. Prisbrey, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
The respondent was charged in the City 
Court of Brigham City, Utah, with the 
crime of driving 70 miles per hour on the 
highways of this state in violation of a 
resolution adopted by the State Road Com-
mission. At the trial in the city court he 
was convicted and appealed the case to the 
district court where the state undertook to 
amend the complaint, charging that the re-
spondent drove 70 miles per hour in viola-
tion of a proclamation issued by the Gover-
nor of Utah. The court permitted the 
amendment and respondent filed a Motion 
to Dismiss. The court granted the motion 
and entered its Judgment of Dismissal on 
the ground that as a matter of law, the 
proclamation of the Governor had no bind-
ing force and effect. The State now ap-
peals from the judgment in favor of respon-
dent. 
[1] While the matter is not raised by 
either party on this appeal, there are two 
reasons why the dismissal must stand. In 
the first place, a complaint on appeal from 
1. Spangler v. District Court, 104 Utah 584. 140 3. Utah, 560 P.2d 312 (1977). 
P.2d 755 (1943). 
4. Utah, 576 P.2d 1278 (1978). 
2. U.C.A., 1953, 77-57-2, 78-4-16. 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, 
and HALL, JJ.r concur. 
WILKINS 
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question. Defendant objected to this evi-
dence on the ground that it was not proper 
rebuttal, and, further, that the questions pro-
pounded to the prosecutrix by the district 
attorney on tills point were leading. The ob-
jections were overruled. We think, under 
the peculiar facts of this case, this was 
error. 
[7] The prosecution of this case seems to 
have been conducted on the theory that the 
defendant was being sued for seduction as 
well as being tried for the adultery. When 
evidence was introduced on behalf of the 
state tending to show that the defendant 
had had adulterous intercourse with the 
prosecutrix as charged in the information, 
the prosecution then proceeded to introduce 
evidence to show that she was first defiled 
by the defendant. In other words, that he 
was responsible for the ruin, downfall, and 
shame of a pure and innocent girl. This 
evidence did not tend to prove or disprove 
any fact material to any issue in the case. 
The only question for the jury to determine, 
was, Did the defendant, who was admitted 
to be a married man, have sexual intercourse 
with the prosecutrix at the time and place 
alleged in the information? The question 
as to whether the prosecutrix was first de-* 
filed by the defendant or some other person 
was not germane to any issue in the case, 
and was therefore wholly immaterial and 
should have been excluded. That this evi-
dence had its effect on the jury and was 
prejudicial to the defendant hardly admits 
of a doubt This we think is shown by the 
remarks of the court to the defendant at 
the time judgment was pronounced. The 
court said: 44This is one of the most serious 
cases of the kind that has come before the 
court for a long time owing to the youth* of 
the girl. From her testimony the jury be-
lieved that you were the father of her ruin." 
We do not refer to these remarks in a spirit 
of criticism, but merely to invite attention 
to the importance that the state attached 
to this phase of the proceedings, and the 
prejudicial effect the evidence In question 
must have had on the jury. 
There are other errors assigned which are 
based on certain rulings of the court, but, 
as no exceptions were taken to the rulings 
and in some instances no objections made 
thereto, we cannot consider them. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause 
remanded, with directions to the trial court 
to grant a new trial. 
FRICK, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur. 
STATE v. MORRIS. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. March 8, 1912.) 
1. HOMICIDE (5 169*)— EVIDENCE—RES GES-
TAE. 
Where a person, after holding ap a pawn-
shop, was pursued by several persons, fired 
several shots at his pursuers, and when caught 
by the deceased turned and shot him, evidence 
of the robbery, flight, and pursuit were admis-
sible as illustrating and characterizing the act 
of the defendant in a prosecution for the homi-
cide. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide. 
Cent. Dig. §§ 341-350; D e c Dig. § 169.*] 
2. HOMICIDE (§ 161*)—EVIDENCE—RES GEST.K 
—PURPOSE OF ADMISSION. 
Such testimony was admissible not only 
to evidence the intent, but also to show the 
motive of the shooting. 
[Ed. 'Note.—For other cases, see Homicide. 
Cent. Dig. § 302; Dec. Dig. § 161.*] 
3. HOMICIDE (§ 308*)—TRIAL—INSTRUCTIONS 
—LANGUAGE OF STATUTE. 
Where a court in its charge defined first 
degree murder, in the language of the statute 
(Comp. Laws 1907, § 4161), as murder perpe-
trated in one of several ways, though the al-
legation of the information alleged and the 
state's proof tended to prove that the defend-
ant willfully, maliciously, etc., shot and killed 
the deceased, the instruction was' proper, as 
the different kinds of first degree murder enu-
merated were so connectedly set forth as to 
render it difficult to state one in the language 
of the statute without stating the others. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, 
Cent. Dig. §§ 642-647; Dec Dig. § 308.*] 
4. CRIMINAL LAW (§ S23*>— TRIAL— INSTRUC-
TIONS—CHARGE AS A WHOLE. 
A charge as to murder in the first degree 
in the language of the statute was not errone-
ous, where the court also told the jury that the 
defendant could not be convicted for the com-
mission of all or any of the "unlawful acts im-
mediately prior or subsequent to the killing** 
of the deceased; that, "in this case, the state 
does not rely for a conviction on the theory 
that the homicide charged in the information 
was committed in the perpetration of or at-
tempt to perpetrate a burglary or robbery"; 
that a finding of the previous commission of a 
robbery or burglary would not change the de-
gree of murder or manslaughter; and also 
charged a conviction only on the ground that* 
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the killing was unlawful, willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated with malice or forethought, and 
with a specific intent to take the life of the de-
ceased, clearly defining the terms used. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal 
Law, Cent Dig. §§ 1992-1995, 3158; Dec Di«. 
§ 823.'] 
5. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 757*)—TRIAL— INSTRUC-
TIONS—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES—PROV-
INCE OF JUBT—"LlBEBTY." 
An instruction that the jury, if they believ-
ed "any witness had willfully testified falsely 
as to any material fact in the case," were "at 
liberty to disregard the whole of the testimony 
of such witness, except as he may have been 
corroborated by credible witnesses or credible 
evidence," was not improper as requiring the 
jury to reject or accept, any portion of the tes-
timony of such a witness, as the word "liber-
ty," as used in the charge, implies freedom and 
choice. 
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal 
Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1772-1785; Dec Dig. | 
757.*] 
6. CBIMINAL LAW (§ 757*)—TBIAL—INSTRUC-
TIONS—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 
The instruction on the credibility of wit-
nesses was not improper as implying that, if a 
witness were corroborated, the jury could not 
reject all or a part of his testimony, where in 
other portions of the charge the court express-
ly told the jury that they were the "sole judges 
of the weight of the evidence, the credibility 
•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r indexes 
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MAYER v. CITY OF CHICAGO 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 70-5040. Argued October 14,. 1971— 
Decided December 13, 1971 
Appellant was convicted on nonfelony charges of violating two 
city of Chicago ordinances and was sentenced to pay a fine of 
$250 on each offense. Desiring to appeal, he petitioned the trial 
court for a free trial transcript to support his appeal on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although the court found that he was indigent, it denied his 
application on the basis of an Illinois Supreme Court rule which 
provided for trial transcripts only in felony cases. Other rules 
provided alternatives to a transcript in the form of a "Settled 
Statement" or an "Agreed Statement of Facts." Without resort-
ing to either alternative, appellant moved for a free transcript 
in the State Supreme Court. The motion was denied. Held: 
1. Although the State must afford the indigent defendant a 
trial " 'record of sufficient completeness7 to permit proper consider-
ation of [his] claims/' Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487, 499, 
it need not necessarily furnish a complete verbatim transcript, but 
may provide alternatives that accord effective appellate review. 
Pp. 193-195. 
2. When the defendant's grounds for appeal, as here, make 
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the State has 
the burden of showing that only a portion thereof or an "alter-
native" will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. P. 195. 
3. The distinction drawn by the State Supreme Court rule be-
tween felony and nonfelony offenses is an "unreasoned distinction" 
proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 195-196. 
4. The fact that the charges on which the appellant was con-
victed were punishable by a fine rather than by confinement does 
not lessen the invidious discrimination against an indigent de-
fendant. Pp. 196-198. 
Vacated and remanded. 
BREXNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
BURGER, C. J., post, p. 199, and BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 201, filed 
concurring opinions. 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIII, § 5 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
History: Const . 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; Cross-References. — Original and appel-
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1. late jurisdiction, § 78-3-4. 
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to 
,hose in this section were formerly found in 
Vrt. VIII, Sees. 7, 8 and 9. 
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general. 
Although district courts of this state are 
irts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdic-
n in all matters both civil and criminal 
ich are not excepted by law or the Constitu-
te one district court has no power to exercise 
itrol over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92 
ih 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
peal by the state in criminal cases. 
*his section does not grant the state a gen-
1 right of appeal in criminal cases. State v. 
bach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977). 
Appeal where case or ig inated in circuit 
court 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals from district court decisions where the 
case originated in a circuit court and involved 
a constitutional issue; Supreme Court's juris-
diction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction 
over appeals from a district court decision 
where the case originated in a justice court, to 
cases involving the constitutionality or valid-
ity of a statute. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1983). 
Appeals. 
The district courts of this state had appellate 
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of 
decisions rendered by board of registration of 
trades and professions revoking license of phy-
sicians. Baker v. Department of Registration, 
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082 (1931). 
District judge who was called to another dis-
trict to try a case did not have jurisdiction to 
settle bill of exceptions in his home district. 
Jenkins v. Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P.2d 220 
(1934). 
Right to appeal is valuable and constitu-
tional right and should not be denied except 
where it is clear that right has been lost or 
abandoned. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
City court supervision. 
District court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecu-
tion; jurisdiction over the person was conferred 
by accused's stipulation that case might be 
transferred from city court to district court and 
his appearance in latter court; fact that prose-
cution was initiated by complaint rather than 
indictment or information did not preclude dis-
trict court jurisdiction. Jardine v. Harris, 63 
Utah 560. 227 P. 1029 (1924). 
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IXDE (§ 354*)—IMPOSITION OF PENAL-
ETION or JURY. 
I
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-For other cases, see Homicide, 
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<#DK (jf 253*)—EVIDENCE. 
lence, in a prosecution for homicide, 
Sustain a conviction for murder in the 
^ee. 
bte.—For other cases, see Homicide, 
fg.'§§ 523-532; Dec. Dig. § 253.*] 
jf* from District Court, Salt Lake 
f. Frederick Loofbourow, Judge. 
^Morris was convicted of murder in 
^degree , and appeals. Affirmed. 
Badger and D. Alexander, for appel-
. R. Barnes, Atty. Gen., for the State. 
COP, J. The defendant was charged 
nd convicted of, first degree murder, 
| a s sentenced to suffer death. He ap-
g ~ The questions presented for review 
O o admission of testimony and to the 
pe evidence on the part of the state 
"^that the defendant and another, be-
t> and 6 o'clock on the afternoon of 
§9* 1911, at Salt Lake City, entered a 
[shop on First South street near Com-
gij street, and, with loaded guns, com-
and compelled the persons in the 
"hold up their hands." Such other 
hem covered with his gun while the 
jlant took from the shop or store $72, 
32 diamonds, and some watches. They then 
left the shop and ran south on Commercial 
street to Orpheum alley, then to State street, 
and then south to Second South street. 
There the defendant ran west on Second 
South street to Commercial street and then 
diagonally across Second South street to the 
sidewalk, where the deceased was killed, 
about a block from the place of the robbery. 
When they left the pawnshop, they were 
pursued by one or more persons from the 
shop calling: "Police! Robbers! Stop them!" 
At or near State street and Orpheum alley, 
the defendant shot at or in the direction of 
one of the persons so pursumg him, and 
then ran down the street with a gun in his 
hand, and calling to those in pursuit to: 
"Stop! Stay back!" A number of persons, 
20 or more, joined in the chase, calling out: 
"There is the other! Stop him! Catch him!" 
The deceased, who was on the platform of a 
street car on Second South street near the 
place of the homicide, stated as he left the 
car, 'Til get him," and ran to the sidewalk. 
There he seized the defendant by the arm or 
shoulder. The defendant turned and said to 
him, "Stop! You son of a bitch!" shoved 
him back* with one hand, and with the other 
shot and instantly killed him. Another im-
mediately seized the defendant by the coat. 
The defendant shot and wounded him, and 
then ran a few rods farther, when he was 
seized by a deputy sheriff. He also shot at 
the deputy; the bullet passing through the 
deputy's clothes. There he was overpowered 
by the deputy and arrested- The defendant 
testified that in his attempt to release him-
self from the deceased's grasp his gun was 
accidentally discharged, and that he remem-
bered nothing more until after his arrest and 
on his way to the police station. 
[1] The defendant complains of the ruling 
admitting the evidence of the robbery, the 
defendant's flight, and his pursuit. It is 
contended these things constituted parts of 
a transaction separate and distinct from that 
on trial. We think not. They were parts of 
one continuous transaction, and were con-
nected with and were a part of the main 
fact under investigation, and tended to illus-
trate and characterize i t They character-
ized and explained the act of the deceased 
seizing the defendant, and the object, pur-
pose, motive, and intent of the shooting. 
The robbery, the flight, the pursuit, the sei-
zure, the shooting, v/e.Y£ as nearly eontera-
poraneous as things could well be. The 
deceased's seizing the defendant and the 
defendant's shooting him were prompted and 
induced under the immediate influences of 
the robbery, the flight, and the pursuit They 
were the product, the outgrowth, of the im-
mediate and present influences of the rob-
bery, the flight, and pursuit The seizure 
and the shooting, of courset could have been 
shown without proof of the preceding cir-
' cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Die & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Hep'r Indexes 
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Jgjfk'1911, at Salt Lake City, entered a 
"Twop on First South street near Corn-
I l l street, and, with loaded guns, com-, 
and compelled the persons in the 
"hold up their hands." Such other 
covered with his gun while the j 
Jant took from the shop or store $72, j 
32 diamonds, and some watches. They then 
left the shop and ran south on Commercial 
street to Orpheum alley, then to State street, 
and then south to Second South street. 
There the defendant ran west on Second 
South street to Commercial street and then 
diagonally across Second South street to the 
sidewalk, where the deceased was killed, 
about a block from the place of the robbery. 
When they left the pawnshop, they were 
pursued by one or more persons from the 
shop calling: "Police! Robbers! Stop them!" 
At or near State street and Orpheum alley, 
the defendant shot at or in the direction of 
one of the persons so pursuing him, and 
then ran down the street with a gun in his 
hand, and calling to those in pursuit to: 
"Stop! Stay back!" A number of persons, 
20 or more, joined in the chase, calling out: 
"There is the other! Stop him! Catch him!" 
The deceased, who was on the platform of a 
street car on Second South street naar the 
place of the homicide, stated as he left the 
car, "I'll get him," and ran to the sidewalk. 
There he seized the defendant by the arm or 
shoulder. The defendant turned and said to 
him, "Stop! You son of a bitch!" shoved 
him back* with one hand, and with the other 
I shot and instantly killed him. Another im-. 
1
 mediately seized the defendant by the coat. 
The defendant shot and wounded him, and 
then ran a few rods farther, when he was 
seized by a deputy sheriff. He also shot at 
the deputy; the bullet passing through the 
deputy's clothes. There he was overpowered 
by the deputy and arrested- The defendant 
testified that in his attempt to release him-
self from the deceased's grasp his gun was 
accidentally discharged, and that he remem-
bered nothing more until after his arrest and 
on his way to the police station. 
[1] The defendant complains of the ruling 
admitting the evidence of the robbery, the 
defendant's flight, and his pursuit. It is 
contended these things constituted parts of 
a transaction separate and distinct from that 
on trial. We think not. They were parts of 
one continuous transaction, and were con-
nected with and were a part ot the main 
fact under investigation, and tended to illus-
trate and characterize It. They character-
ized and explained the act of the deceased 
seizing the defendant, and the object, pur-
pose, motive, and intent of the shooting. 
The robbery, the flight, the pursuit, the sei-
zure, the shooting, were as nearly contem-
poraneous as things could well be. The 
deceased's seizing the defendant and the 
defendant's shooting him were prompted and 
induced under the immediate influences of 
the robbery, the flight, and the pursuit They 
were the product, the outgrowth, of the im-
mediate and present influences of the rob-
bery » the flight, and pursuit The seizure 
and the shooting, of coursex could have been 
shown without proof of the preceding cir-
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that this is why the law requires a hearing 
in this case. See Ramsey v. United States, 
569 A.2d 142 (D.C.1990), cited by the major-
ity.) The mandate of § 23-110 is clear: 
"[u]nless the motion and files and records 
of the case conclusively show that the pris-
oner is entitled to no relief, the court shall 
cause notice thereof to be served upon the 
prosecuting authority, grant a prompt 
hearing thereon, determine the issues, and 
make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with respect thereto." D.C.Code 
§ 23-110 (1989 Repl.). 
The problem with the majority's reason-
ing is that it has put the cart before the 
horse. In finding that the outcome of the 
case would have been no different under 
the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 66S, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), it is carving out any 
exception to the mandate of § 23-110. It 
has stopped short of holding that the sped-
fications of the motion are "patently friv-
olous" or "palpably incredible." It could 
not so hold on the face of the record be-
cause, with respect to those specifications, 
there is no record. We have repeatedly 
emphasized that, when a post-trial motion 
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
hearing is required, "where the ineffective-
ness concerns facts dehors the record." 
See Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 
1278, 1283 (D.C.1987), citing Gibson, su-
pra, 388 A.2d at 1216; see also Miller v. 
United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869-70 (D.C. 
1984). Only recently we re-emphasized the 
importance of developing a pertinent factu-
al record where an appellant has raised a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 
1336, 1338-39 (D.C.1990); see Johnson v. 
United States, 585 A.2d 766 (D.C.1991). 
I would remand the record for a hearing 
and appropriate findings. 
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Defendants were convicted in the Su-
perior Court, Joseph M. Hannon, Robert M. 
Scott, George Herbert Goodrich and Henry 
H. Kennedy. Jr., JJ., of drug offenses, and 
they appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rog-
ers, C.J., held that District of Columbia 
Controlled Substances Act was not invali-
dated by mayor's failure to republish 
schedules of controlled substances. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>105 
Challenge to validity of statute under 
which defendant was convicted constituted 
challenge to court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion which could not be waived. 
2. Statutes «^188 
Reliance on plain language of statute 
may not suffice when to do so would pro-
duce result which is contrary to intent of 
legislature. 
3. Statutes <£=>227 
Meaning of the word "shall" in a stat-
ute is not always mandatory command, but 
may be directory. 
4. Drugs and Narcotics <s=343 
District of Columbia Controlled Sub-
stances Act was not invalidated by mayor's 
failure to republish schedules of controlled 
substances; intent of council of the District 
of Columbia was to require republication 
only when revisions were made to sched-
ules. D.C.Code 1981, § 33-523. 
